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liberty inspired us with unanimity, that system would never have carried us
through” (2, 228).
Governmental units that are closer and more directly accountable to
the people that they serve may well have certain advantages. State legis-
latures and city councils are often in a much better position to address
issues that are “purely local” than are remote central authorities (89).
The question that Watkins neither asks nor answers, however, is whether
the “vexing modern problems” confronted by Congress and the Supreme
Court during and after the New Deal were actually local in either nature or
effect. In the 1780s, the United States had scant infrastructure. Movement
of goods and people between the several states was a time-consuming and
tedious process. But by the 1930s, most of the impediments to quick and
efficient interstate commerce had disappeared. The doctrine of “substantial
economic effect,” embraced in Wickard v. Filburn (1942), may have been
neither necessary nor economically sensible in the Confederation area. But
its value—and constitutional propriety—became entirely different matters
later, when local and state boundaries had become irrelevant in an inte-
grated national economy.
Such is the practical problem, albeit one of considerable significance,
that Watkins and his fellow proponents of states’ rights tend to relegate to
the background or, more often, simply ignore. More tellingly, Wickard
indicates, as Watkins claims (90), “a substantial departure from the original
understanding of the Commerce Clause” only if one ignores (or does not
credit) what Marshall said in Gibbons v. Ogden (1824) about the ability of
the federal government to reach “those internal concerns which affect
the States generally” (22 U.S. [9 Wall.]) at 195).
None of this commentary is new—neither Watkins’ advocacy for a
different organizational vision nor the opposing impatience with cri-
tiques that gloss over the practical realities and compromises required
in an effective national government. The opposing perspective is aptly
represented by Justice Benjamin Cardozo’s rejection—articulated in
Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc. (1935)—of the Anti-Federalists’ “paro-
chial” philosophy in favor of a Constitution “framed upon the theory
that the peoples of the several states must sink or swim together, and
that in the long run prosperity and salvation are in union and not divi-
sion” (294 U.S. at 523).
Mark R. Killenbeck
University of Arkansas School of Law
TheContract Clause: AConstitutionalHistory. By JamesW.Ely, Jr. (Lawrence,
University Press of Kansas, 2016) 384 pp. $39.95
If the Constitution were a zoo, what resident animal would the Contract
Clause be? The clause, which is found in Article I, section 10 of our
founding document, reads: “No state shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing
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the Obligation of Contracts.” It certainly would not be one of the zoo’s
star attractions; the Contract Clause is no First Amendment lion or Fourth
Amendment tiger. But it is no bat-eared fox (the Letters of Marque
Clause?) or Eurasian water shrew (the Third Amendment?) either. Based
on reading Ely’s comprehensive history of the Contract Clause, perhaps it
would be an animal that used to be a big draw but is now one that visitors
might check out at the zoo if they had the time but not necessarily a
priority. A tapir or some kind of rare goat?
Ely’s volume is without a doubt the most exhaustive and authori-
tative modern treatment of the Contract Clause ever presented, a book
that constitutional scholars and historians will want to consult whenever
they find themselves needing to know nearly anything about the pro-
vision. In seven thorough substantive chapters, Ely traces the history of
the clause chronologically from its origins in the late eighteenth century
through the modern day. He stops along the way to look in detail at
how the clause fared when Chief Justices John Marshall and Roger
Taney led the Supreme Court, when the nation was recovering from
the Civil War, and when President Franklin D. Roosevelt expanded the
scope and reach of the federal government during the New Deal. In each
of these eras, Ely maps the approach of courts—mostly the U.S. Supreme
Court but state and lower federal courts as well—alongside historical
events and the shifting tide of public opinion toward such central concerns
as the sanctity of contracts, the importance of a private market economy,
and the rights and obligations of states to provide for the public welfare
of their citizens.
The book is weakest when cataloging, in dry and overly intricate
detail, case after case decided by the courts regarding whatever the issue
happens to be, and it is strongest when linking the evolution in judicial
interpretation of the clause to broader historical currents. Ely persua-
sively establishes that the Marshall Court’s original strong reading of
the clause—including its holding in Dartmouth College v. Woodward
(1819) that corporate charters counted as contracts—was linked closely
to the widespread belief in the era that “the reliability of agreements
were essential . . . in a growing market economy” (14). Similarly, Ely
explains how the Court’s weakening of the clause during and after the
New Deal era—as exemplified by its 1934 decision in Home Building and
Loan Association v. Blaisdell, upholding a Minnesota law providing certain
kinds of debt relief to mortgagors—was reflective of the widespread
belief of the time that the state should have the authority to address emer-
gency conditions and other social and economic problems. “The princi-
ple of governmental noninterference with contracts, a norm expressed
in the contract clause,” Ely writes, “was sharply at odds with New Deal
constitutionalism” (232).
Will the Contract Clause ever rise to prominence again? Ely hints
that it might, suggesting that “[t]alk of its demise is exaggerated” (2). It
surely would not be the first long-dormant constitutional clause to make
a comeback; consider the recent revival of the Interstate Commerce
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Clause or the Second Amendment. One never knows, in other words,
when today’s Third Amendment will become tomorrow’s, well, Fourth
Amendment. But what Ely has shown in his impressive book is that
regardless of the Contract Clause’s future, its past will always be well
worth considering. After all, there is nothing wrong with taking a break
from the zoo’s eco-celebrities to watch an interesting tapir for a little
while, right?
Jay Wexler
Boston University School of Law
Feeding Gotham: The Political Economy and Geography of Food in New York
City, 1790–1860. By Gergely Baics (Princeton, Princeton University Press,
2016) 368 pp. $39.95
In the early nineteenth century, residents of New York City relied
primarily on public markets to obtain beef and other food supplies.
However, in 1843, the city ended the public markets’ monopoly on beef
sales, leading to a rapid privatization of food provisioning in the city. In
Feeding Gotham, Baics explores the rise and fall of these markets, con-
cluding that their demise led to deteriorating food access for lower
income New Yorkers.
Baics draws from a wide variety of sources and techniques to tell
this story. In one chapter, he relies on the diaries of Evert Bancker, Jr.,
a state politician, and banker John Pintard to analyze the consumption
patterns of New Yorkers during the 1820s and 1830s. Historians have
long mined Pintard’s diary for his insights about notable political and
social developments, but few of them have utilized it to capture the
rhythms of daily life. Pintard and, by extension, other New Yorkers
patronized public markets three to four times a week. Baics combines
Pintard’s observations with public data to trace the seasonal variations
in food consumption. Beef was the primary protein source for most
New Yorkers, though they also ate poultry, veal, and other meats
when they were in abundance. Baics makes a strong argument that city
residents enjoyed better access to fresh red meat than did their rural
counterparts, who generally relied on preserved supplies. He attributes
this urban advantage to numbers: The density of residents in New York
ensured a steady supply of livestock into the city, and thus regular access
to beef.
Baics’s most valuable contribution consists of the maps that he cre-
ated to illustrate the role of the public markets in urban life. These de-
tailed maps illuminate many aspects of the city’s geographical and
economic structure, including the location of slaughterhouses and the
relationship between population and food purveyors. The maps help
readers to understand the lived geography of the city and clarify the dif-
ferential access to food based on income and residential location.
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